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Previous research on the allocation of scarce resources shows that when people are assigned 
labels of leader or follower in their group, leaders allocate more of the scarce resources to 
themselves than followers do. In three laboratory studies, we examine the idea that how people 
are selected for the leader role (i.e. election or appointment) determines whether leaders take 
more or equal shares (relative to followers) from a common resource. In a fi rst experiment, 
we show that participants were more accepting of norm violating behavior by an appointed 
versus elected leader. In a second experiment, we show that when participants were assigned 
to a leader or follower role, allocations of appointed leaders differed signifi cantly from those 
of elected leaders and followers, whereas there was no difference between the two latter 
conditions. Moreover, elected leaders were shown to feel more social responsibility than both 
appointed leaders and followers. In a fi nal experiment, we show that when participants were 
primed with the concept of social responsibility (relative to a neutral condition) no difference 
in allocations between appointed and elected leaders emerged.
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class many business leaders choose the latter 
option. Or, when allocating resource funding 
within universities leaders frequently advocate 
Within situations of interdependence, as can be 
found in groups and organizations, allocation 
decisions are predominantly made by those in 
charge (Yukl, 1998). Often, the decisions that 
these leaders have to take revolve around dis-
tributing scarce resources that are much needed 
to serve the collective and organizational inter-
est (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Mannix, 1993). A 
striking observation is that leaders frequently 
benefi t themselves at the expense of others when 
allocating (fi nancial) resources. For example, 
when being able to fl y economy or business 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
356
(in implicit and sometimes even explicit ways) 
larger donations to the department that they are 
or were affi liated with. Quite often, economic 
analyses are used to explain such self-serving 
behavior by those in charge, like, for example, 
the need for leaders to be tough negotiators and 
uphold the image of being in power. 
Social psychological analyses on the other 
hand focus on the power of the social setting 
and its related cognitions. That is, this approach 
suggests that merely assigning people to higher 
positions (e.g. providing participants the label 
leader) may also increase their tendency to put 
their own interests fi rst. In particular, it may well 
be that merely assigning people to a leader role 
by calling them ‘the leader’ is enough for them 
to benefi t themselves at the expense of others. 
Such analysis thus relies on the assumption that 
if a participant is labeled a leader by the experi-
menter without any additional information about 
the leader role or task at hand, participants rely 
on category-consistent information to base their 
evaluations and decisions on (see Phillips & 
Lord, 1982). In this case the information they 
rely on may be the idea that a leader is entitled 
to pursue privileges and self-interest. 
Recent experimental research has empirically 
documented this social psychological approach 
by making use of a resource dilemma paradigm 
in which participants were told that they were the 
fi rst (out of a group of, for example, six people) 
to take from the common resource. This position 
of being the fi rst to take from the resource creates 
a situation in which no anchoring on other’s 
behavior can take place and as such decisions 
will thus primarily be determined by one’s own 
conceptions of what constitutes a good and fair 
decision to oneself (a value that is expected to 
be colored by how one’s position in the group 
is labeled). These series of laboratory studies 
in which participants were university students 
indeed showed that people who were simply 
labeled leader or supervisor harvested more 
from a common resource than participants who 
were assigned a lower hierarchical role by being 
labeled follower (De Cremer, 2001, 2003a; De 
Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005; Samuelson & Allison, 
1994; Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006).
A common explanation for this effect is 
derived from insights of the social cognition liter-
ature (e.g. S. T. Fiske, 1993) and equity theory 
(e.g. Adams, 1965). More precisely, when people 
are labeled as leader, role schemas are evoked 
that are consistent with the label leader (cf. 
Phillips & Lord, 1982) and one such specifi c 
schema is the expectation that they deserve 
more privileges than subordinates do (S. T. Fiske, 
1993; Messé, Kerr, & Sattler, 1992). Moreover, 
being cognitively assigned the leader position 
also evokes expectations that one will have to put 
more effort and work into the situation (relative 
to followers), as such making one feel privileged 
to receive higher outputs (Adams, 1965; Walster, 
Berscheid, & Walster, 1973). These explan-
ations thus point out one important process 
explaining a leader’s tendency to take more 
out of a shared resource than followers do, that 
is, feeling entitled to take more. In support of 
this argument, De Cremer and Van Dijk (2005) 
indeed demonstrated that role schemas asso-
ciated with leadership created a feeling of be-
ing entitled to higher outcomes, consequently 
affecting harvesting behavior (see also De 
Cremer, 2003a; Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 
2005; Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006).
Do leaders always take more than 
followers?
Of course, from the perspective that leaders are 
assigned to facilitate contributions to the col-
lective welfare (e.g. De Cremer & Van Vugt, 
2002; Tyler & Huo, 2002), treat members in fair 
and respectful ways (De Cremer, 2003b), and 
thus display a socially responsible orientation 
toward the collective and its members (Chemers, 
2001; Yukl, 1998), the above research fi ndings 
may prove unsatisfying and even discouraging. 
As a matter of fact, in the leadership literature 
it is acknowledged that the label of leader can 
make salient ideas of two motives: the idea of 
being motivated to uphold socially respon-
sible behavior on one hand and being entitled 
to receive privileges on the other hand. Do 
we have to conclude that after receiving the 
label of leader people immediately take the 
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self-interested perspective of entitlement for 
granted (cf. Epley & Caruso, 2004, for the idea 
that self-interest is immediate)? Or, do specifi c 
conditions exist making people act in more 
socially responsible ways when the label leader 
is allocated to them? 
Recent research by Van Dijk and De Cremer 
(2006) showed that, in line with Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, and Anderson’s (2003) proposition 
that people in higher positions (e.g. leaders) 
behave more in accordance with their personality 
traits, individual differences in social value orien-
tation (Van Lange, 1999) moderate this label 
effect. That is, participants allocated more from 
the shared resource to themselves when called 
leader relative to being called follower, but only 
when they possessed a proself orientation. In 
contrast, when participants possessed a prosocial 
orientation no such differences between leaders 
and followers emerged. These results thus sug-
gest that among certain individuals the distinction 
in labels between leader and follower may not 
infl uence their allocation behavior. Interestingly, 
research on social value orientation has shown 
that prosocials differ from proselfs, among 
others, in terms of how socially responsible they 
feel toward interdependent others (De Cremer & 
Van Lange, 2001). In this view, social responsibility 
is perceived as refl ecting people’s concern for 
both self and others’ interests (motivated by the 
moral consideration of how one ought to act; 
A. P. Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; 
cf. Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). However, 
the fi ndings of Van Dijk and De Cremer (2006) 
did not reveal any evidence that social respon-
sibility was activated in their studies.
Building on the above, we wish to argue that 
people assigned to the leader role will not solely 
act in egocentric ways when allocating resources. 
In the spirit of the Van Dijk and De Cremer 
(2006) research, we wish to examine which 
factors moderate the tendency of people to take 
more from a resource when being assigned to 
the leader role than when being assigned to the 
follower role. However, rather than focusing on 
the impact of individual differences, we now focus 
on the social infl uences that may keep leaders 
from taking more from a common resource than 
followers from a common resource. It is not 
always an easy task to design infl uence systems 
aimed at affecting the attitudes and actions of 
only a few people. From a social psychological 
perspective, it is more benefi cial if we under-
stand how we should label hierarchical positions 
in such a way that the predicted effect would 
emerge. Therefore, the present research will 
complement and move beyond existing research 
in several ways. First, it will identify one specifi c 
social variable affecting the infl uence of the 
already established leader–follower distinction 
on allocation decisions. Second, it will show that 
this specifi c social variable may reveal benefi cial 
effects because it evokes thoughts and evaluations 
of social responsibility.
More precisely, one specifi c social variable 
that potentially could infl uence the effect of 
leader–follower labels is the procedure under-
lying leader selection. That is, whether the 
leader role is assigned via the procedure of 
election or appointment (Hollander, 1985) should 
impact upon the expectations that the label 
of leader evokes. In the following paragraphs, 
we will elaborate on the importance of leader 
selection.
The role of selection procedures
As mentioned earlier, prior research has often 
assigned participants to the leader role by simply 
labeling them as the leader (not providing any 
further information about the role and its con-
tent, which allowed for participants to infer 
the content of being the leader themselves). 
However, it is the case that in many group or 
organizational situations the label of leader is 
associated with the procedure used to select 
the leader. Leaders may be imposed on the 
group by an (external) authority and thus be 
appointed, without the group having a say in it. 
On the other hand, groups themselves may elect 
who they wish to be in charge. Thus, a leader 
can be called an elected leader or an appointed 
leader. Will these different labels evoke different 
cognitive expectations and thus impact dif-
ferently upon the way leaders evaluate their own 
role and subsequently act upon it? As Hollander 
(1985, p. 507) states, ‘appointment or election 
therefore affects a leader’s actions’. Moreover, 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
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research has shown that selection of leadership 
(a) infl uences perceptions of the quality of the 
relationship between the group leader and the 
others (Hollander & Julian, 1970), (b) provides 
a basis for how leaders will perceive whether 
continuity of leadership is required and wished
for (A. M. Cohen & Bennis, 1961), and (c) creates 
different social environments consequently 
affecting the importance of specifi c types of 
leadership behaviors (Hollander, 1985, 1992). 
With respect to the notion of electing a leader, 
the group is believed to support one specifi c 
person and thus in a way transfers hopes and 
expectations upon the leader. Indeed, Hollander 
and Julian (1970) argue that, ‘election builds 
higher demands on the leadership role’ (p. 66). 
Moreover, research by Ben-Yoav, Hollander, and 
Carnevale (1983) suggests that elected leaders 
are perceived as more responsive to the needs 
of followers and the interests of the group. As a 
result, we argue that an elected leader will create 
a socially shared expectation that he will do 
things right and thus act socially responsible 
and fairly. After all, the notion of election holds 
that the group has voted for him and thus 
expects certain indications of reciprocity. Indeed, 
according to Kenney, Schwartz-Kenney, and 
Blascovich (1996, p. 1130), people ‘have a greater 
investment in elected leaders and, therefore, 
have higher performance expectations’. Thus, 
because an elected leader refl ects the choice of 
the group and its members, an elected leader 
will feel strong support from the followers who 
will bestow on the leader a high sense of social 
responsibility ( Julian, Hollander, & Regula, 
1969; Kenney et al., 1996). With respect to an 
appointed leader, things look different. Because 
such a leader does not ‘owe’ his/her selection 
to the group members, the leader may not feel 
that he/she has to carry the weight of group’s 
expectations to be a fair and socially respon-
sible decision maker. In fact, research suggests 
that appointed leaders are expected to devote 
less attention to the needs and interests of the 
group members (Kenney et al., 1996). Moreover, 
groups will perceive appointed leaders as less 
legitimate and expect less from such leaders 
in terms of performance expectations (see 
De Cremer & Van Vugt, 2002; Hollander, 1992; 
Hollander & Julian, 1970). 
Taken together, based on this literature, one 
could thus suggest that if leaders are appointed, 
relative to being elected by the group, they 
will reason less in terms of social responsibility 
(i.e. being fair and cooperative toward the group 
and its norms). The inducement of these socially 
shared expectations (by means of the procedure 
of election vs. appointment) should therefore 
affect the decisions of leaders when allocating 
common resources. 
Building on the above, we predict that leader 
selection and role assignment will interact in 
determining allocation decisions in such a way 
that leaders will take more from the common 
resource than followers do, but mainly when 
the leader is appointed. In contrast, when the 
group elects the leader less difference in terms 
of resource allocations is expected between 
leaders and followers. Furthermore, it is expected 
that in the case of being elected by the group, 
leaders will experience more feelings of social 
responsibility than those appointed in the leader 
role. Finally, elaborating on the potential role 
of social responsibility, we expect that activating 
the concept of social responsibility may motivate 
appointed leaders to make similar allocations 
to those of elected leaders. These predictions 
will be examined across three experimental 
studies.
Experiment 1
As we noted earlier, the insights derived from the 
leadership literature suggest that people have 
socially-shared norms of what to expect from 
elected and appointed leaders. These socially-
shared norms infl uence the decisions of leaders 
(Hollander, 1985). Therefore, in Experiment 1, 
we fi rst wanted to test whether observers react 
differently toward norm deviating behavior 
enacted by an elected leader relative to an 
appointed leader. More precisely, building on 
the leadership literature, it should be expected 
that people have higher expectations of elected 
leaders (relative to appointed leaders) to do 
their job in a socially responsible way and thus 
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to adjust their decisions more to what is seen 
as normative behavior. Indeed, after having 
elected the leader, people may feel that they 
have a vested interest in the decisions that 
the leader subsequently makes. As such, if the 
elected leader violates these expectations, e.g. 
by displaying self-interested behavior, people 
may react negatively. Interestingly, this prediction 
is also in line with the idea that leaders elected 
by the group (relative to appointed leaders) are 
often seen as being representative of the group’s 
identity and the norms that it advocates. As 
such, if an elected leader then violates norma-
tive allocation behavior (e.g. by taking an equal 
share from the common resource) this may be 
experienced as a threat to the group’s identity, 
resulting in followers not accepting this behavior 
(cf. Haslam et al., 1998). 
It is fair to note, however, that an alterna-
tive explanation also exists. That is, it could 
be the case that an elected leader actually has 
more leeway (instead of less) in making his or 
her decisions. More precisely, it may also be the 
case that people will reason that if a leader is 
elected the group will also award this leader the 
opportunity to receive some benefi ts and priv-
ileges associated with the leader position. This 
line of reasoning would then suggest that people 
would actually accept more easily allocation 
behavior deviating from what is normatively 
expected from an elected leader than from an 
appointed leader. 
The selection procedure of the leader was 
manipulated by informing participants whether 
the group selected the leader (i.e. election) or 
whether an outside authority selected the leader 
(i.e. appointment). Deviation from normative 
behavior was manipulated by letting the selected 
leader take an amount similar to what other 
people usually take (i.e. an equal share of the 
common resource: 15 euros from a resource of 
90 euros) or an amount signifi cantly higher than 
the equal share (22 euros from a resource of 
90 euros). The amount of 15 was chosen because 
it represents the equality-rule in the present 
study, whereas the amount of 22 was chosen as 
it represents the average amount that partici-
pants in prior research took from a resource of 
90 points when being assigned the leader label 
(see e.g. De Cremer, 2003a).
Method
Participants and design Ninety-fi ve under-
graduate students (average age = 20.98 years) 
participated voluntarily in exchange for course 
credits. They were randomly assigned to a 
2 (Leader selection: Elected vs. appointed 
leader) × 2 (Resource share: 15 vs. 22) between-
subjects design. 
Procedure Upon arrival in the laboratory, 
participants were placed in a cubicle for the ex-
periment containing a table and a chair. Then, a 
booklet was given to the participants introducing 
them to the allocation situation. Participants 
were asked to evaluate the described situation. 
Modeled after Van Dijk and De Cremer (2006, 
Experiment 1), participants were introduced to 
a description of members of a management team 
consisting of one leader and three followers. 
Then, the role manipulation was introduced. 
In the elected leader condition, participants read 
that the leader was elected by the team to do a 
good job. In the appointed leader condition, par-
ticipants read that an authority from outside the 
group appointed the leader to do a good job. In 
addition, all participants learned that the team 
had been successful, and that the company had 
decided to allocate a bonus of 90 payment units 
to the team. This bonus would be divided by 
allowing each team member to take the amount 
they wished from the resource. The leader was 
said to take fi rst from the bonus. Thereafter, the 
resource share manipulation (i.e. 15 or 22 units) 
was introduced. Participants read: ‘The leader 
has taken 15/22 units from the bonus. This 
amount is roughly the same/more as the average 
amount that people take.’
Finally, the dependent measures of Experi-
ment 1 were solicited. To assess the effectiveness 
of our resource share manipulation we asked 
participants how much the leader took from 
the common resource (which could range from 
0 to 90). In addition, participants were also 
asked whether the leader took more from the 
bonus than the average amount (1 = not at all, 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
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7 = very much so). Then, participants were asked 
to indicate to what extent they considered the 
leader to be appointed by another party than 
the group (1 = not appointed at all, 7 = very much 
appointed). Subsequently, we examined whether 
participants accepted the allocation behavior 
of the leader by asking them to what extent 
they thought that the choice of the leader was 
‘defensible’ and ‘justifi ed’ (r = .45, p < .001). 
These two items were also responded to on a 
7-point scale (1 = not at all defensible/justifi ed, 
7 = ver y much defensible/justified). Finally, 
participants were debriefed, thanked, and 
dismissed.
Results
Manipulation checks An analysis of frequencies 
revealed that in both resource share conditions 
all the participants (100%) correctly recalled 
whether the leader took 15 or 22 euros. 
Further, a 2 × 2 Analysis of Varience (ANOVA) 
on the question whether the leader took more 
than the average amount only yielded a main 
effect of Resource share (F(1, 91) = 111.59, 
p < .001, η2 = .55), showing that the leader was 
seen as taking more than the average amount 
in the 22 units relative to the 15 units condition 
(Ms = 5.50 vs. 2.21). 
Further, a 2 × 2 ANOVA on the question to 
what extent the leader was appointed by another 
party than the group only yielded a main effect 
of Leader selection (F(1, 91) = 180.09, p < .001, 
η2 = .66), showing that an appointed leader was 
perceived as appointed by an outside author-
ity relative to an elected leader (Ms = 6.23 vs. 
2.16). 
Acceptance A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the acceptance 
score revealed, fi rst of all, a signifi cant effect 
of Resource share (F(1, 91) = 131.95, p < .001, 
η2 = .59), indicating that a share of 15 units was 
accepted more than a share a 22 units (Ms = 6.22 
vs. 3.67). Also, a signifi cant interaction emerged 
(F(1, 91) = 7.31, p < .01, η2 = .07) (see Table 1). 
The effect of Leader election was signifi cant 
within the 22 unit condition (F(1, 91) = 9.53, 
p < .01), but not within the 15 unit condition 
(F(1, 91) < 1, p < .35). 
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 show that people 
were more accepting of normative deviating 
behavior by an appointed than by an elected 
leader. This fi nding suggests that people place 
higher demands on the shoulders of elected 
leaders (relative to appointed ones) and expect 
them to act more socially responsible (Hollander, 
1992; Hollander & Julian, 1970; Kenney et al., 
1996). Although this fi rst evidence is supportive 
of our line of reasoning, it has to be noted that 
Experiment 1 only tested people’s evaluations 
toward leaders as a function of how they were 
selected. Therefore, we also have to examine 
whether leaders themselves act according to 
their roles (and associated expectations). 
In Experiment 2, participants will receive 
the label of elected leader, appointed leader 
or follower and they will have to decide in an 
actual resource task how much to take from the 
common resource. Importantly, in this com-
mon resource task, participants’ decisions 
will be anonymous. The reason for this is that 
(based on the fi ndings of Experiment 1) elected 
leaders might act in socially appropriate ways 
and thus strategically conform to the socially 
shared expectations of others. Making decisions 
anonymously should not elicit such social 
Table 1. Means of acceptance of the leader’s choice as a function of leader selection and resource share 
(Experiment 1) 
 Resource share
 
Leader selection 15  22
Appointed 6.06 (0.95, n =17) 4.11 (1.26, n = 28)
Elected 6.39 (0.82, n = 22) 3.23 (1.05, n = 28)
Notes : Entries represent the acceptance score on a 7-point scale, with higher values indicating higher 
acceptance. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations and number of participants per cell.
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reputation concerns and would allow us to 
test directly the kind of behaviors the label of 
leader and follower elicits. In fact, if elected 
leaders under anonymous conditions take less 
than appointed leaders and equally as much as 
followers, this would be supportive of the notion 
that these leader types have internalized social 
responsibility thoughts. In line with this idea, 
we will also test whether elected leadership not 
only evokes expectations of social responsibility 
among observers (as suggested in Experiment 1) 
but also among people allocated to the elected 
leader position by assessing their feelings of 
social responsibility.
Method
Participants and design Sixty-six undergraduate 
students (average age = 20.42 years) participated 
voluntarily in exchange for course credits. They 
were randomly assigned to one of the three selec-
tion procedure conditions (appointed leader, 
elected leader, or follower).
Procedure Upon arrival in the laboratory, par-
ticipants were placed in a cubicle for the ex-
periment containing a table and a chair. Then, 
a booklet was given to participants introducing 
them to the allocation situation that they would 
participate in. Participants learned that they 
were members of a four-person group, but that 
they would not learn their fellow group mem-
bers’ identities. 
Participants learned that their group pos-
sessed a collective resource of 90 points, which 
had a fi nancial value (a total of 9 euros). Then, 
it was explained that the group had to decide 
how to divide the resource. More precisely, it was 
said that each group member had to decide how 
many of these points he or she would allocate to 
themselves. Participants could keep the points 
(and earned fi nancial value) that they allocated 
to themselves. In line with previous research 
on the role assignment effect (i.e. De Cremer & 
Van Dijk, 2005; Samuelson & Allison, 1994), it 
was further said that the decisions would be taken 
sequentially, that is, one decision after another 
decision. Moreover, participants were informed 
that it would be decided randomly which group 
member would be the fi rst to take from the 
resource, which member second, and so forth. 
Thus, after the decision of the fi rst member, the 
collective resource would be adjusted (i.e. the col-
lective resource would be reduced with the 
number of the points that the fi rst member 
allocated to him/herself) and again after the 
choice of the second member, and so forth. All 
participants were informed that they were the 
fi rst to take from the common resource.
After participants were acquainted with the 
main characteristics of the resource dilemma, 
the manipulation of position was induced. Fol-
lowing previous research (e.g. Samuelson & 
Allison, 1994), participants in the appointed leader 
condition learned that the experimenter had 
decided to choose them as the group member 
occupying the position of leader, and that the 
others would occupy the position of follower. 
In the follower condition, participants learned that 
the experimenter had decided that they would 
occupy the role of follower (see De Cremer & 
Van Dijk, 2005). In the elected leader condition, 
participants were told that each group member 
would be asked who to elect as the leader (based 
on the scores of the participants on personality 
questionnaires that had to be fi lled out at the 
beginning of the experimental session). Then, 
participants were asked to wait for a few moments 
because another group members’ opinion would 
be asked fi rst. After a while, they were told that 
they did not have to give their opinion anymore 
because the other group members had all 
indicated that they wanted the focal participant 
to be the leader. 
Then, the dependent measures of Experi-
ment 2 were solicited. First, participants were 
asked to which role they were assigned (1 = 
appointed leader, 2 = elected leader). Thereafter, 
participants were requested to take from the 
common resource (ranging from 0 to 90). Finally, 
participants were asked to what extent they 
felt social responsibility toward the others in 
the present situation (1 = not all, 7 = very much 
so), before being debriefed, thanked, and 
dismissed.
Results
Manipulation checks An analysis of frequencies 
revealed that in both leader conditions and 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
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in the follower condition all the participants 
(100%) correctly recalled which role they were 
assigned to. 
Resource allocation A one-way ANOVA on the 
resource allocation score revealed a signifi cant 
effect of Role (F(2, 62) = 4.13, p < .05, η2 = .12). 
A Least-Signifi cant Differences Test showed 
that participants allocated signifi cantly more to 
themselves in the leader appointed condition 
(M = 30.65) than in the leader elected by 
the group (M = 23.57, p < .05) and follower 
conditions (M = 23.54, p < .05). The two latter 
conditions did not differ from each other 
(p < .99).
Feelings of social responsibility A one-way 
ANOVA on the social responsibility score re-
vealed a signifi cant effect of Role (F(2, 63) = 4.06, 
p < .05, η2 = .11). A Least-Signifi cant Differences 
Test showed that participants in the leader 
elected by the group (M = 5.90) felt more socially 
responsible than those in leader appointed 
(M = 5.04, p < .05) and follower conditions 
(M = 4.72, p < .005). The two latter conditions 
did not differ signifi cantly (p < .46).
Experiment 3 
As expected, the results of Experiment 2 showed 
that the procedure used to select the leader sig-
nifi cantly infl uenced resource allocations. More 
precisely, leaders appointed by the experimenter 
signifi cantly allocated more resources to them-
selves than followers, as such paralleling earlier 
research showing that leaders take more from 
a common resource than followers do (e.g. 
De Cremer, 2003a; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005; 
Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006). Importantly, 
however, when the group elected the leader, 
participants occupying the leader role did not 
take more from the resource than followers. 
In addition, the fi ndings of Experiment 2 also 
provided evidence that participants assigned 
to the elected leader role felt more socially re-
sponsible than when assigned to the appointed 
leader role or follower role.
Thus, so far our fi ndings suggest that the allo-
cations of elected leaders are similar to those of 
followers’ allocations and that the allocations 
of appointed leaders deviate signifi cantly from 
the others. This observation may suggest that 
the conclusions derived from previous re-
search that leaders make more self-serving allo-
cation decisions than followers (De Cremer & 
Van Dijk, 2005; Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006) 
may only be applicable to appointed leaders. 
Therefore, to examine more closely what it 
is about leadership and allocation decisions 
we need to identify when appointed leaders 
make similar allocation decisions to elected 
leaders. Following from the leadership litera-
ture ( Hollander & Julian, 1970; Kenney et al., 
1996) and the findings of Experiment 2 it 
may be suggested that elected leadership is 
characterized by a strong conception of social 
responsibility. If this is the case, then it could be 
expected that reinforcing such a conception of 
social responsibility among appointed leaders 
would motivate them to act more in line with the 
allocation decisions made by elected leaders. Ex-
periment 3 was designed to test this question. 
To test this relationship we rely on social 
cognition insights noting that once a specifi c 
concept (in this case social responsibility) is made 
accessible, associated concepts such as other-
orientation and prosocial behavior should be 
activated, which indicates that they serve as inter-
pretative frames in the subsequent phases of the 
experiment (Higgins, 1996; Neely, 1977). That 
is, we argue that using an accessibility technique 
where participants write about and refl ect upon 
the concept of social responsibility activates 
other-oriented concerns, which will then direct 
subsequent allocation behavior. This effect is 
expected to primarily emerge among those 
leader types where social responsibility initially 
is less salient, that is, appointed leaders. As such, 
no difference in allocation behavior between 
elected and appointed leaders is expected 
when social responsibility is reinforced. In the 
neutral condition, we also asked participants 
to actively describe a neutral concept, as we 
wanted to avoid the case that the difference 
between the social responsibility condition and 
the neutral condition could also be explained 
by having asked participants to do something 
in the former condition and to do nothing in 
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the latter condition. Therefore, we used a task 
that has been shown to elicit neutral thoughts 
and affect; that is, we asked participants to 
describe the qualities of a chair (taken from 
Schwinghammer, Stapel, & Blanton, 2006). In 
this condition, the difference in allocations 
between elected and appointed leaders (as 
demonstrated in Experiment 2) is expected 
to emerge.
Method
Participants and design Sixty-nine under-
graduate students (average age = 20.80 years) 
participated voluntarily in exchange for course 
credits. They were randomly assigned to a 2 
(Accessibility: Social responsibility vs. chair) × 2 
(Leader Selection: Appointment vs. election) 
between-subjects factorial design. 
Experimental procedure Upon arrival in the 
laboratory, participants were placed in a cubicle 
for the experiment containing a table and a 
chair. The same procedure as in Experiment 2 
was followed. Again, participants were told to 
be part of a group of four people and that each 
group member would have to make an allo-
cation decision. Again, a common resource of 
90 points was available for the group to allocate. 
As in Experiment 2, it was said that the decision 
of how much to take from the common resource 
would be sequential. All participants, however, 
were supposedly chosen randomly to be the 
fi rst to take from the common resource (see 
also Allison & Messick, 1990; De Cremer, 2003a; 
De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005; Samuelson & 
Allison, 1994, for a similar procedure). Contrary 
to Experiment 2, the following changes were 
implemented. First of all, in Experiment 3, 
participants were only allocated to the leader 
appointment or leader election condition. The 
selection procedure was the same as in Experi-
ment 2. A second modifi cation was that while 
participants were waiting to receive information 
about their role in the group, they were sup-
posedly asked to participate in a short unrelated 
task. This fi ller task constituted the priming 
procedure aimed at making accessible the con-
cept of social responsibility or the concept of a 
chair (= neutral condition; cf. Schwinghammer 
et al., 2006). More precisely, participants wrote 
down either a description of the concept social 
responsibility or a description of a chair. They 
wrote a detailed description of this situation on 
a separate sheet for 3 minutes. After this, we 
assessed participants’ mood (i.e. how happy do 
you feel at the moment?), and feelings of social 
responsibility (i.e. the extent to which they ex-
perienced a prosocial attitude toward others).
Then, the dependent measures of Experi-
ment 3 were solicited. To check for the effec-
tiveness of the leadership selection manipulation, 
participants were fi rst asked whether they were 
allocated the role of leader (1 = yes, 2 = no). 
Then, they were asked whether the experimenter 
allocated them the position of leader (1 = yes, 
2 = no). Subsequently, they were asked whether 
the group had decided which role they would 
take (1 = yes, 2 = no). Thereafter, participants were 
requested to take from the common resource. 
Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked, 
and dismissed.
Results
Manipulation checks To check for the validity 
of our prime manipulation, it was fi rst checked 
whether participants actually wrote down any 
thoughts in the accessibility manipulation. 
After this was checked, seven participants who 
wrote nothing were removed from the analyses. 
Then, we conducted an inter-rater reliability 
analysis ( J. Cohen, 1968). More precisely, two 
judges coded whether the participants wrote down 
a recall of the concept of social responsibility 
or of the concept chair depending on the 
experimental condition that the participants 
were allocated to, resulting in high inter-rater 
agreement (Cohen’s Kappa = .84). 
Further, a 2 × 2 ANOVA, on the question to 
what extent they had a prosocial attitude toward 
others in the present situation, only revealed 
a marginal signifi cant effect of Accessibility 
(F(1, 58) = 3.63, p = .06, η2 = .06), showing that 
participants in the social responsibility condition 
experienced stronger feelings of prosocial 
attitudes toward others than those in the chair 
condition (Ms = 6.03 vs. 5.49). 
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Because prior research has shown that acces-
sibility methods may infl uence mood (Sedikides, 
1995), consequently infl uencing the effect of the 
accessibility method on the dependent measure 
under investigation, we asked participants to 
indicate how happy they felt (1 = not at all, 
7 = very much). A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the happiness 
item revealed no signifi cant effects of Accessibil-
ity (F(1, 57) = 3.20, p < .08), Leader selection 
(F(1, 57) < 1, p < . 10), nor the Interaction 
(F(1, 57) < 1, p < .99). As such, our accessibility 
method did not infl uence participants’ positive 
mood, suggesting that we do not have to control 
for this variable in our main analyses. Overall, 
we can conclude that our prime manipulation 
was successful.
To see whether our selection procedure mani-
pulation was successful, we fi rst of all conducted 
an analysis of frequencies on the question 
whether participants were allocated the role of 
leader showing that all participants responded 
with yes. Further, an analysis of frequency on the 
question whether the experimenter appointed 
the role of leader showed that in the elected 
leader condition 100% of the participants re-
sponded with no, whereas in the appointed 
leader condition 78% responded with the option 
yes. Finally, another analysis of frequency on the 
question whether the group selected the role 
showed that in the elected leader condition 
97% of the participants responded with yes, 
whereas in the appointed leader condition 94% 
responded with the option no.
Resource allocation A 2 × 2 ANOVA on 
the resource allocation score revealed only a 
signifi cant interaction between Accessibility 
and Leader selection (F(1, 58) = 4.22, p < .05, 
η2 = .07) (see Table 2). The means in Table 2 
clearly show that appointed leaders in the chair 
prime condition harvested by far the highest 
resource shares. Simple effect tests indeed show 
that Leader selection revealed a signifi cant effect 
among those in the chair condition (F(1, 58) 
= 4.67, p < .05), but not in the social responsibility 
condition (F(1, 58) = .44, p < .51). 
General discussion
Taken together, the present results are supportive 
of our prediction that the manner used to 
select leaders may signifi cantly infl uence how 
leaders make allocation decisions in common 
resource dilemmas. In identifying this effect 
of the selection procedure the role of social 
responsibility was further explored. In the fol-
lowing paragraphs, we will discuss the most im-
portant fi ndings.
The fi rst fi nding of importance is that the 
procedure used to allocate people to a leader 
position within an interdependent resource 
situation signifi cantly infl uences the impact that 
the label leader has on how observers evaluate 
the allocation decisions made by the leader. 
First of all, in Experiment 1 it was found that 
deviating behavior by an appointed leader was 
accepted more than similar deviating behavior by 
an elected leader. These fi ndings are supportive 
of earlier leadership research suggesting that 
the selection procedure signifi cantly affects the 
leadership process, in the eyes of both observers 
and the leader himself (Hollander & Julian, 
1970; Julian et al., 1969). That is, following these 
theories, elected leadership should be associated 
with the notion of social responsibility, because 
elected leaders are expected to display socially 
Table 2. Means of resources allocated to oneself as a function of accessibility and leadership selection 
procedure (Experiment 3) 
  Accessibility
 
Leadership selection procedure  Social responsibility Chair
Appointed 25.13 (5.24, n = 15) 36.32 (22.54, n = 17)
Elected 28.36 (12.31, n = 19) 24.54 (5.06, n = 11)
Notes : Entries are allocations ranging from 0 to 90, with higher values indicating higher allocations to oneself. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations and number of participants per cell.
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appropriate and normative behavior. In contrast, 
appointed leaders have a less clearly defi ned ex-
pectation pattern and as such may have more 
leeway in making their decisions. 
Importantly, however, the fi ndings of Experi-
ment 2 showed that the ideas that observers use 
to evaluate those called leader also seem to oper-
ate among those individuals placed in the re-
spective leader role. Indeed, elected leaders acted 
more socially responsible than appointed leaders, 
whereas there was no difference in allocations 
between elected leaders and followers. The fact 
that this effect was found in a decision-making 
situation under which decisions were anony-
mous testifi es to the idea that individuals also 
internalized these expectations and thus do not 
solely display these types of behavior to conform 
to the expectations of the others. Finally, our 
results also revealed direct evidence that the 
notion of social responsibility (as advocated 
by Hollander, 1985) seems to play a role when 
explaining allocation differences between 
elected and appointed leaders. In Experiment 2 
it was found that elected leaders felt more 
socially responsible toward others relative to 
appointed leaders and followers. In addition, 
in Experiment 3, it was further shown that if 
the concept of social responsibility was made 
accessible the allocations of appointed leaders 
were not different from the allocations of those 
among whom social responsibility is already a 
salient issue, that is, elected leaders. 
All in all, these fi ndings complement prior 
research showing that if individuals are allocated 
to the leader role they (under certain circum-
stances) allocate more resources to themselves 
relative to when being allocated to the follower 
role (De Cremer, 2003a; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 
2005; Samuelson & Allison, 1994; Stouten et al., 
2005; Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006). However, 
the present fi ndings qualify and go beyond 
this observation in a variety of ways. First, the 
present fi ndings demonstrate that these prior 
research fi ndings only apply to leaders that are 
appointed by an external authority. Indeed, when 
the group elects the leader then resource alloca-
tions are not different anymore from the one 
that followers make. Second, prior research only 
focused on the self-interested side of allocation 
behavior by identifying feelings of entitlement 
as the explanatory factor of the difference in 
allocations between leaders and followers. The 
present research, however, adopted a perspec-
tive in which the role of social responsibility 
was explored. After all, it is clear that leaders 
are not only expected to take up the privileges 
associated with the leader role but also to take 
charge of the group in ways that benefi t the 
welfare of the group; thus, to display fair and 
socially responsible behavior (Lord, Foti, & 
de Vader, 1984; Yukl, 1998). As such, the present 
research is the fi rst (at least to our knowledge) 
to show when this social responsibility side of 
leadership is most likely to come into play when 
allocating resources.
Thus, an important conclusion that can be 
derived from the present fi ndings is that it 
suggests that when it comes to the allocation 
of scarce resources, conclusions that leader-
ship may bring out the ‘worst’ in people (i.e. self-
benefi ting behavior) are not necessarily accurate. 
Indeed, the current fi ndings now suggest that the 
reported increase in self-benefi ting allocations, as 
shown in prior research, does not really emerge 
when the leader is elected (then allocations are 
similar to those of followers). Interesting to 
note in this respect, however, is that our fi nd-
ings in Experiment 2 showed that elected 
leaders felt more socially responsible than both 
appointed leaders and followers. Thus, elected 
leaders did show less self-interested behavior 
than appointed leaders and both leader types 
differed in how socially responsible they felt, but 
although elected leaders and followers made 
equal allocation decisions they also differed 
in feelings of social responsibility. This fi nding 
therefore emphasizes the importance of paying 
closer attention to the role of followers and what 
exactly makes followers act so prosocially. It 
seems clear that other psychological processes 
may be involved than in the process of elected 
leadership and therefore we urge future research 
to explore this question in greater depth. 
The present fi ndings may also have important 
implications for the management of common 
resources and managers’ knowledge. First of 
all, our research fi ndings suggest that providing 
employees with job or status labels does not seem 
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entirely without problems. Calling people a leader 
or a follower may activate expectations consistent 
with each of these labels, consequently affecting 
their behaviors within the group or organization. 
This cognitive effect is especially important to 
take into account at the managerial level where 
managers may reason that self-favoring behavior 
is legitimate. As such, promotion decisions and 
decisions to re-label people’s positions or roles 
should not go without an analysis accounting 
for its possible behavioral consequences. In 
fact, because in organizations a view is endorsed 
that leader fi gures take care of the welfare of the 
organization, it is important for organizations 
to be aware that cognitive effects such as leader 
labels may actually have opposite effects. 
One reason why organizations may be unaware 
of the effects of these cognitive effects is that 
this kind of perspective treats leadership as a 
relatively narrow concept (i.e. identifying it as a 
label that people use), whereas in organizations 
leadership is defi ned in broader terms including 
important behaviors and beliefs. More precisely, 
this broader notion of leadership includes a 
stronger focus on how leaders develop and main-
tain relationships with their followers through 
their actions. For example, with respect to the 
relational aspects of leadership research has 
shown that leaders displaying self-sacrifi ce (e.g. 
De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2002) or even 
servant behaviors (e.g. Greenleaf & Spears, 2002) 
develop trusting and trustworthy relationships. 
Despite the fact that our narrow focus on 
leadership can be considered a limitation when 
looking at the ecological validity of our studies, 
the present results nevertheless provide useful 
insights even when looked at from a broader 
perspective on leadership. More precisely, our 
fi ndings concerning elected leadership convey a 
rather optimistic message for actual leadership 
effects—namely that elected leaders (relative 
to appointed leaders) seem to act as good 
models. Recent research on the importance of 
charismatic leadership indicates that leaders 
showing self-benefi ting behavior are perceived 
as less effi cient and charismatic because these 
behaviors may model unfair behavior for 
others (De Cremer, 2002; De Cremer & Van 
Knippenberg, 2002). Elected leaders, however, 
do show constraint (at least to the same extent 
as followers) and may therefore be perceived as 
more effi cient, charismatic, and fair authority 
figures; all perceptions that enhance the 
legitimacy of the leader (Tyler, 2006). In turn, 
legitimacy makes followers accept the alloca-
tion decisions made by the leader more easily. 
Future research may thus further elaborate on 
the relationship between elected leadership 
perceptions, legitimacy, and the willingness of 
followers to support this type of leader.
The suggestion that elected leaders are evalu-
ated as more legitimate may also reveal inter-
esting links with the notion of power. That is, 
some recent research has shown that those 
high in power (relative to low) may feel more 
socially responsible and act more fairly and less 
prejudiced (see Vescio, Gervais, Heidenreich, & 
Snyder, 2006). Because we argue that elected 
leaders may feel more socially responsible, 
one could hypothesize that maybe they also feel 
more powerful. Future research should thus 
examine the relationship between the cognitive 
label of elected leadership, feelings of power 
and social responsibility and its effects on the 
willingness to act more prosocially.
Having raised all possible implications of 
the present fi ndings one may still note that the 
artifi cial nature of our experimental set-up and 
the absence of feeling of belonging to an actual 
organizational group represents an important 
limitation. Therefore, we are, of course, aware 
that the practical implications outlined must be 
tempered by also being aware of the obvious limit-
ations that we mentioned. It is clear that issues 
such as generalizability are important to draw 
implications for organizational life and there-
fore we also need studies with high external and 
ecological validity. However, it is fair to note that a 
large body of research in real work settings suffers 
from the problem of having to demonstrate 
causal relationships, and, as such, is limited in 
being able to provide a strong theoretical and 
controllable explanation for the phenomena 
under investigation. Experimental setups may 
be a fi rst step in developing and testing specifi c 
theoretical predictions, which at the same time 
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can be highly relevant to organizational settings 
as well, before examining whether the same 
processes emerge in real-life settings. 
Taken together, the current fi ndings shed 
more light on the apparent pervasiveness of the 
enhancement of self-interest by those in higher 
positions (see e.g. De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005) 
by showing that the emergence of this effect 
depends on how the leader is selected. When 
people are elected to a leader position then the 
concept of social responsibility is brought into 
play, making allocations less self-interested. In 
the case of appointed leadership, the concept 
of social responsibility seems to remain rela-
tively silent unless made salient. Viewed this 
way, selection procedures may be the qualifying 
factor that can bring the two faces of leadership 
(i.e. entitlement versus social responsibility) 
to life. 
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